Yes, i'm telling you my years of fanatic watching of ESPN had no effect on my opinion of Iran.
How about you spend your time convincing us of why Iran is to be trusted instead of me explaining something everyone already accepts. The field is yours. we are listening..........
not being an expert in this field I decided to what one of the worlds leading experts on international relations has to say on the subject:
CONCLUSION
The conclusion is in two parts. After saying what follows for American policy from my
analysis, I briefly state the main reasons for believing that the slow spread of nuclear
weapons will promote peace and reinforce international stability.
Implications for American Policy
I have argued that the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is better than no spread and
better than rapid spread. We do not face a set of happy choices. We may prefer that
countries have conventional weapons only, do not run arms races, and do not fight. Yet
the alternative to nuclear weapons for some countries may be ruinous arms races with
high risk of their becoming engaged in debilitating conventional wars.
Countries have to care for their security with or without the help of others. If a country
feels highly insecure and believes that nuclear weapons will make it more secure,
America?s policy of opposing the spread of nuclear weapons will not easily determine
theirs. Any slight chance of bringing the spread of nuclear weapons to a full stop exists
only if the United States and the Soviet Union constantly and strenuously try to achieve
that end. To do so carries costs measured in terms of their other interests. The strongest
means by which the United States can persuade a country to forgo nuclear weapons is a
guarantee of its security, especially if the guarantee is made credible by the presence of
American troops. But how many commitments do we want to make and how many
countries do we want to garrison? We are wisely reluctant to give guarantees, but we
then should not expect to decide how other countries are to provide for their security.
As a neighbour of China, India no doubt feels more secure, and can behave more
reasonably, with a nuclear weapons capability than without it. The thought applies as
well to Pakistan as India?s neighbour. We damage our relations with such countries by
badgering them about nuclear weapons while being unwilling to guarantee their
security. Under such circumstances they, not we, should decide what their national
interests require.
If the United States and the Soviet Union lessen their opposition to the spread of nuclear
weapons, will not many states jump on the nuclear bandwagon? Some have feared that
weakening opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons will lead numerous states to
make them because it may seem that ?everyone is doing it?.
Why should we think that if the United States relaxes, numerous states will begin to
make nuclear weapons? Both the United States and the Soviet Union were more relaxed
in the past, and these effects did not follow. The Soviet Union initially furthered
China?s nuclear development. The United States continues to help Britain maintain her
deterrent forces. By 1968 the CIA had informed President Johnson of the existence of
Israeli nuclear weapons, and in July of 1970 Richard Helms, Director of the CIA, gave
this information to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These and later disclosures
were not followed by censure of Israel or by reductions of assistance to her. And in
September of 1980 the Executive Branch, against the will of the House of
Representatives but with the approval of the Senate, continued to do nuclear business
with India despite her explosion of a nuclear device and despite her unwillingness to
sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Assisting some countries in the development of nuclear weapons and failing to oppose
others has not caused a nuclear stampede. Is the more recent leniency towards India
likely to? One reason to think so is that more countries now have the ability to make
their own nuclear weapons, more than forty of them according to Joseph Nye.
Many more countries can than do. One can believe that American opposition to nuclear
arming stays the deluge only by overlooking the complications of international life. Any
state has to examine many conditions before deciding whether or not to develop nuclear
weapons. Our opposition is only one factor and is not likely to be the decisive one.
Many countries feel fairly secure living with their neighbours. Why should they want
nuclear weapons? Some countries feeling threatened, have found security through their
own strenuous efforts and through arrangements made with others. South Korea is an
outstanding example. Many South Korean officials believe that South Korea would lose
more in terms of American support if she acquired nuclear weapons than she would
gain by having them. Further, on occasion we might slow the spread of nuclear
weapons by not opposing the nuclear-weapons programmes of some countries. When
we oppose Pakistan?s nuclear programme, we are saying that we disapprove of
countries developing nuclear weapons no matter what their neighbours do. Failing to
oppose Pakistan?s efforts also sends a signal to potential nuclear states, suggesting that
if a country develops nuclear weapons, a regional rival may do so as well and may do so
without opposition from us. This message may give pause to some of the countries that
are tempted to acquire nuclear weapons. After all, Argentina is to Brazil as Pakistan is
to India.
Neither the gradual spread of nuclear weapons nor American and Russian acquiescence
in this has opened the nuclear floodgates. Nations attend to their security in ways they
think best. The fact that so many more countries can make nuclear weapons than do
make them says more about the hesitation of countries to enter the nuclear military
business than about the effectiveness of American policy. We can sensibly suit our
policy to individual cases. sometimes bringing pressure against a country moving
towards nuclear-weapons capability and sometimes quietly acquiescing. No one policy
is right for all countries. We should ask what our interests in regional peace and stability
require in particular instances. We should also ask what the interests of other countries
require before putting pressure on them. Some countries are likely to suffer more in cost
and pain if they remain conventional states than if they become nuclear ones. The
measured and selective spread of nuclear weapons does not run against our interests and
can increase the security of some states at a price they can afford to pay.
It is not likely that nuclear weapons will spread with a speed that exceeds the ability of
their new owners to adjust to them. The spread of nuclear weapons is something that we
have worried too much about and tried too hard to stop.
The Nuclear Future
What will a world populated by a larger number of nuclear states look like? I have
drawn a picture of such a world that accords with experience throughout the nuclear
age. Those who dread a world with more nuclear states do little more than assert that
more is worse and claim without substantiation that new nuclear states will be less
responsible and less capable of self-control than the old ones have been. They express
fears that many felt when they imagined how a nuclear China would behave. Such fears
have proved un-rounded as nuclear weapons have slowly spread. I have found many
reasons for believing that with more nuclear states the world will have a promising
future. I have reached this unusual conclusion for six main reasons.
First, international politics is a self-help system, and in such systems the principal parties
do most to determine their own fate, the fate of other parties, and the fate of the
system. This will continue to be so, with the United States and the Soviet Union filling
their customary roles. For the United States and the Soviet Union to achieve nuclear
maturity and to show this by behaving sensibly is more important than preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Second, given the massive numbers of American and Russian warheads, and given the
impossibility of one side destroying enough of the other side?s missiles to make a
retaliatory strike bearable, the balance of terror is indestructible. What can lesser states
do to disrupt the nuclear equilibrium if even the mighty efforts of the United States and
the Soviet Union cannot shake it? The international equilibrium will endure.
Third, at the strategic level each of the great powers has to gauge the strength only of
itself in relation to the other. They do not have to make guesses about the strengths of
opposing coalitions, guesses that involve such imponderables as the coherence of
diverse parties and their ability to concert their efforts. Estimating effective forces is
thus made easier. Wars come most often by miscalculation. Miscalculation will not
come from carelessness and inattention in a bipolar world as it may in a multipolar one.
Fourth, nuclear weaponry makes miscalculation difficult because it is hard not to be
aware of how much damage a small number of warheads can do. Early in this century
Norman Angell argued that wars could not occur because they would not pay. But
conventional wars have brought political gains to
some countries at the expense of others. Germans founded a state by fighting three short
wars, in the last of which France lost Alsace. Lorraine. Among nuclear countries,
possible losses in war overwhelm possible gains. In the nuclear age Angell?s dictum,
broadly interpreted, becomes persuasive. When the active use of force threatens to bring
great losses, war become less likely. This proposition is widely accepted but
insufficiently emphasized. Nuclear weapons have reduced the chances of war between
the United States and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China. One
may expect them to have similar effects elsewhere. Where nuclear weapons threaten to
make the cost of wars immense, who will dare to start them? Nuclear weapons make it
possible to approach the deterrent ideal.
Filth, nuclear weapons can be used for defence as well as for deterrence. Some have
argued that an apparently impregnable nuclear defence can be mounted. The Maginot
Line has given defence a bad name. It nevertheless remains true that the incidence of
wars decreases as the perceived difficulty of winning them increases. No one attacks a
defence believed to be impregnable. Nuclear weapons may make it possible to approach
the defensive ideal. If so, the spread of nuclear weapons will further help to maintain
peace.
Sixth, new nuclear states will confront the possibilities and feel the constraints that
present nuclear states have experienced. New nuclear states will be more concerned for
their safety and more mindful of dangers than some of the old ones have been. Until
recently, only the great and some of the major powers have had nuclear weapons. While
nuclear weapons have spread, conventional weapons have proliferated. Under these
circumstances, wars have been fought not at the centre but at the periphery of
international politics. The likelihood of war decreases as deterrent and defensive
capabilities increase. Nuclear weapons, responsibly used, make wars hard to start.
Nations that have nuclear weapons have strong incentives to use them responsibly.
These statements hold for small as for big nuclear powers. Because they do, the
measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.
https://woc.uc.pt/feuc/course/MRI/2007-2008/Kenneth Waltz - more is better.pdf
